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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,

]

vs.

;
1
J

DONALD J. PECK,
Defendant-Appellant,

CASE NO. 20057

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

over 90% of the marital property to the wife/ where the
parties had substantially similar earning power and had made
substantially similar contributions to the acquisition of the
marital assests?
2.

Was it reversible error for the trial court to

fail to make any finding as to the earning power of each of
the parties?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce.

After a trial before

the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on April 19/ 1984/ the trial court
granted a divorce to the plaintiff-respondant (wife)/ and
awarded her $10/000,00 as alimony and over 90% of the marital
assets as a property award.

The defendant-appellant

(husband) thereafter perfected this appeal from the property
division only.

A copy of the trial court's findings of fact

and conclusions of the law is attached hereto as Appendix

1

"A".

A copy of the decree of divorce is attached as

Appendix "B".
The plaintiff and defendant were married September 16/
1950.

Of the children born to the marriage/ four were still

living at the time of the divorce, and each had obtained the
age of majority and each was self-supporting.
During the past few years the husband has had to live away
from home for extended periods of time to pursue his work as an
electrical power line contractor.
for divorce on January 6/ 1984.
counterclaimed for divorce.

The wife filed this action
(R. 1-4)

(R. 11-12)

The husband also
The husband elected

to abandon his counterclaim at the trial and did not rebut
or cross-examine the wife's testimony as to the grounds for
divorce.

The trial court granted a divorce to the wife based

on mental cruelty.

(R. 81/ 88)

The granting of the divorce

to the wife is not challenged by this appeal.

(R. 95)

Shortly after the complaint was filed/ the wife sought
and obtained an order requiring the husband to pay temporary
alimony to the wife in the amount of $1/500.00 per month/ and
prohibiting the husband from disposing of any of the business
assets without consent of the wife.

(R. 13)

was not present at the hearing (Tr. 115)/

The husband

and moved/ through nev

counsel/ for a re-hearing on the temporary order/ and affirmatively sought to have the wife restrained from interfering
with the operation of the husband's business.

(R. 22-23)

On stipulation of the parties/ the court entered an order
restraining the wife from interfering with the husband's business
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The issue of temporary support was reserved for trial.

After

the trial/ the court suspended all except $1/500.00 of
the temporary alimony/ and ordered the husband to pay future
alimony of $10,000.00/ payable $2,000.00 per year.

(R. 91-92)

The orders/ judgment and decree with respect to temporary
and permanent alimony are not challenged by this appeal.
This appeal challenges the trial court's divison of the
marital assets.

The parties owned two business/ Peck's Plants

and Diana/ Inc./ and in addition owned substantial real
and personal property.

Diana/ Inc./ was the corporation

through which the husband operated his business as an electrical
power line contractor.

(Tr. 120)

Peck's Plants/ a greenhouse/

was operated primarily by the wife.

The parties had historically

used the income from Diana, Inc., for living expenses, and the
income from Pecks Plants for investments.

(Tr. 35.).

The evidence concerning Diana, Inc., indicated that, although historically had been a profitable business, it had a
negative net worth at the time of trial.

Of the two line trucks

used in the business, one had been repossessed and the other
had been transferred to the Peck's son.
other capital equipment had been°stolen.

(Tr. 127)

Much of the

(Tr. 155-57, 173) With

no line trucks/ and having lost much of the other equipment/
Diana, Inc. could no longer contract for large projects as it
had in the past.

(Tr. 127/ 165-66)

Mr. Peck had been able to

secure one job with Parowan City, where the city allowed him
to borrow its line truck/ but had not been able to locate any
other work within the capabilities of Diana ; Inc. (Tr. 127/
152)

Mr. Peck testified that the net worth of Diana, Inc., at
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the time of trial was a negative $50/400.00.
22)

(Ex. 16/ Tr. 121-

Although the wife tried to discredit this testimony/ she

offered no other testimony concerning the net worth/ at the
time of trial/ of Diana, Inc.
Peck's Plants had in the last few years demonstrated an
income potential of approximately $15/000.00 to $20/000.00 per
year.

(Tr. 91)

Peck's plants also suffered from the need for

capital improvements.

There was testimony that some of the

small enclosures needed repair/ and that it would cost approximately $1/200.00 to perform the repairs.

(Tr. 27) There was

also testimony that Peck's Plants had not been able to purchase
the necessary inventory/ and at the time of trial had only
$4,500.00 in inventory, in contrast with $31,000.00 in
inventory the previous year.

(Tr. 109)

The testimony concerning the value of the real and personal
property of the parties was conflicting.

The wife's witness

as to the value of the real property was Mr. James Bartorelli,
a title researcher and real estate salesman.

(Tr. 7)

husband testified as to the value on his own behalf.

The

The major

items of property were the parties' home, the Swasey property,
the Miller Creek property, Peck's Plants, Diana, Inc., and
the cars and trucks.
The parties' home consisted of a 1744 square foot house
on a little less than an acre of ground, together with the
greenhouses.

(Ex. 7, Tr. 10)

In addition, there was a

fifty foot strip of property on the north (Rowley property)
and another parcel of property of approximately one-half
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acre on the south of the home (state property).

Mr. Bartorelli

testified that the home/ greenhouse/ and land was worth only
$68,500.00/ due to a very depressed market.

(Tr. 11-12) The

Bartorelli figure included the Rowley property but did not
include the state property.

(Tr. 10-11)

Mr. Bartorelli did

not have any estimate as to the value of the state property.
Mr. Peck testified that the home property was worth $100/000.00
and that the state property was worth $40/000.00.
Tr. 124)

(Ex. 17/

Mrs. Peck testified that the Rowley property had

been purchased for $7/500.00.

(Tr. 113)

There was a mortgage

against the home of approximately $26/000.00/ leaving an
equity of approximately $42/588.00 according to the Bartorelli
figures/ and approximately $122/000.00 according to Mr.
Peck's figure.
The Swasey property consisted of approximately 56.63
acres of development property.

The Peck's owned only a 58%

interest in the property; the remaining 42% was owned by Mr.
Garn Anderson/ a banker.

(Tr. 36) Twenty

acres of the

original 56.63 acres had been sold to Mike Dimitric and
another on contract for $4/000.00 an acre.

(Tr. 37) The re-

maining balance due on the Dimitric contract was approximately
$51,000.00 payable $9/000.00 per year.

(Tr. 37)

Mr.

Bartorelli testified that the 56.63 acres had a fair market
value of $42,200.00.

(Ex. 7)

Mr. Bartorelli did not take

into account the fact that 20 acres of the parcel had
already been sold for $80/000.00.

Mr. Bartorelli also did

not make any separate assessment of the property owned by
the Pecks as opposed to that which had been sold on contract
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to Mr. Dimitric.

(Ex. 7)

Mrs. Peck testified that she

would not sell the properties for anything close to the low
values placed on the property by Mr. Bartorelli.

(Tr. 96)

Mr. Peck testified that the portion of the Swasey Property
retained by the Pecks was worth approximately $100/000.00.
(Ex. 17/ Tr. 124) There was a mortgage against the Swasey
property of approximately $18/560.00.

(Ex. 8)

The Miller Creek property consisted of 17 acres of
development property which was purchased for $3/000.00 per
acre, or $51/000.00.

(Tr. 32)

Mr. Bartorelli testified

that the current depressed value of the property was $13/000.00,
(Ex. 7)

Mr. Peck testified that the property was worth

$48/000.00.
the property

(Ex. 17/ Tr. 124)

There was a mortgage against

of $36/800.00 (Ex. 8 ) / leaving a negative

equity of $23/800.00 according to the Bartorelli figures,
and a positive equity of $11/200.00 according to Mr. Peck's
figures.
The parties owned a 1983 Cadillac automobile/ which
Mrs. Peck testified had a current value of approximately
$14/000.00.

(Tr. 45)

There was a lien against the Cadillac

for the sum of $9/000.00 (Tr. 4 5 ) , leaving an equity of
$5,000.00.
The 1977 Chevrolet one-ton dump truck was used by Mrs.
Peck in her business.

(Tr. 31)

Mrs.

Peck testified the

truck had a value of $2,500.00 to $3,000.00.

(Tr. 30-31)

Mr. Peck testified that the value was $2,000.00 (Ex. 17, Tr.
124)
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The 1979 GMC Jimmy had a value/ according to Mr. Peck/
of $3/500.00.

(Ex. 17/ Tr. 124)

Mrs. Peck did not have any

testimony as to the value of the 1979 GMC Jimmy.
The parties also owned various items of personal property
including a decanter collection/ certain antique furniture/
a carved kitchen chair and a bronze coal miner.

Mr. Peck

testified that the decanter was worth $4/000.00; the old
furniture/ $500.00; the carved kitchen chair/ $200.00; and
the bronze coal miner/ $3/500.00;

all other bronzes/

$27,000.00; all other antiques, $25/000.00; all other household goods, $15/000.00.

(Ex. 17, Tr. 124)

Mrs. Peck did

not testify concerning the value of these items.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the
matter under advisement, and subsequently awarded Mr. Peck
the 1979 GMC Jimmy, the personal property in his possession,
and Diana, Inc.

All other real and personal property was

awarded to Mrs. Peck.

(R. 88-92) Mr. Peck thereafter perfected

this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In dividing the marital property, the trial court is
required to make an equitable division of the property.
There should be no punitive element in a division of property.
The trial Court's division will be affirmed on appeal unless
there was an abuse of descretion.

In the instant matter, it

is evident that the trial court did abuse its descretion.
Although the evidence concerning the value of the marital
property was sharply in conflict, even using those figures
most favorable to the wife it is evident that the wife

7

received well over 90% of the marital property.

Prior

decisions of this court have established that such a
lopsided award constitutes an abuse of discretion, and
the decree in this case should be modified or
reversed.
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the trial court specifically find each
material fact in issue.

In a divorce proceeding, this

includes specific findings as to the current income of
each of the parties, and should also include
sufficient findings as to the value of the properties
such as will enable an appellate court to make a
considered review of the matter. The trial court in
this matter failed to make any findings concerning the
current income of either of the parties.

As an

alternative to a reversal of the trial court*s decree,
therefore, this matter should be remanded with
instructions to the trial court to enter specific
findings of fact.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AWARD OF OVER 90% OF THE MARITAL ASSETS
TO THE WIFE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In dividing the marital property, the trial court
is instructed and empowered to "make such orders in
relation to the . . . property . . . as may be
8

equitable."

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984).

An

equitable division should result in an approximately
equal division of the property.

Clausen v. Clausen,

675 P.2d 562, 565 (Utah 1983).
Although no formula can be set which will govern
all cases, this court has often set forth a list of
various factors that may be considered:
They include: the respective ages of the
parties; what each may have given up for the
marriage; what money or property each
put into the marriage; the physical and
mental health of the parties; the relative
ability, training and education of the
parties; the duration of the marriage; the
present income of the parties; the efforts
exerted by the parties in acquiring marital
property; the present mental and physical
age of the parties; the ability of the wife
to provide income for herself; and the
ability of the husband to provide support.
Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).

The

evidence indicated that the parties were approximately
equal with respect to each of these factors.
Notwithstanding the parties' relative equality
with respect to each of these factors, the trial
court's award of property was grossly biased in favor
of the wife.

The trial court did not make any

findings as to the value of the various items of
property, and it is therefore impossible to obtain a
true picture of the extent of the disproportionality
of the decree.

Even viewing all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the wife, however, the
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disproportionate nature of the division is
evident. The wife offered no testimony as to the value
of the household furniture and bronze and antique
items, but the husband testified that they were valued
at least $75,000.00.

The wife was also awarded the

Swasey property, together with any interest in the
Dimitric contract.

Although the wife's appraiser

testified that the value of the entire Swasey property
was $42,200.00, the court did not make any finding as
to what portion of the value attached to the property
retained by the Pecks as opposed to that sold to
Dimitric.

It was undisputed that the face value of

the contract to Dimitric was $51,000.00 and the Pecks
58% share of that contract would be $29,580.00.

The

mortgage against the Swasey property was $18,560.00.
It is therefore evident that the equity awarded to the
wife is in the $20,000.00 to $30,000.00 range.
The defendant, on the other hand, was awarded a
1979 GMC Jimmy, which, although it had a value of
$3,500.00, was subject to an $8,000.00 debt (Tr.46),
and was also awarded Diana, Inc.

The only competent

evidence as to the value of Diana, Inc., was that of
Mr. Peck, who testified that it had a negative net
worth $50,400.00.

The wife attempted to discredit

this testimony by showing that the corporation had
made money in the past, but offered no evidence as to
10

the current earning power of the corporation.
Mr. Peck testified that the corporate assets had
been depleted, and that there was little or no
possibility that the corporation would be able to earn
money as it had in the past without a substantial
influx of capital.

(Tr. 127, 165-66)

Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the wife, therefore, it is evident that
the wife was awarded property with a total value of at
least $130,000.00 or more, while the husband was
awarded property with a negative value of
approximately $60,000.00. Although the defendanthusband acknowledges that the trial court is vested
with a considerable latitude of discretion, that
discretion is not without bounds, and a trial court's
award will be reversed where there was an abuse of
discretion.

"An abuse of discretion is manifested by

a substantially inequitable division of the marital
estate."

Holston v. Holston, 668 P.2d 1048, 1051

(Mont. 1983).
The only rationale that can be conceived for the
trial court's award of property in this matter is that
the trial court was attempting to impose some
punishment on Mr. Peck for his allegedly culpable
conduct leading to the divorce.

A case very similar

to the instant matter in that respect is Read v. Read,
11

594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979).

The court in that case

stated as follows:
In the case before us it appears that
the trial court's property award may reflect
a degree of punishment against the defendant
for his extra marital conduct and relative
"guilt" in bringing about the dissolution of
the marriage. A trial court must consider
many factors in making a property settlement
in a divorce proceeding, but the purpose of
the settlement should not be to impose
punishment upon either party. In Wilson
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977
(1956), we stated the law with respect
to this issue:
In regard to the defendant's
contention that the judgment
represents an effort of the court
to impose a punishment upon him:
We recognize that there is no
authority in our law for
administering punitive measures
in a divorce judgment, and that
to do so would be improper, except
that the court may, and as a
practical matter invariably does,
consider the relative loyalty or
disloyalty of the parties to their
marriage vows, and their relative
guilt or innocence in causing the
breakup of the marriage. It is to
be recognized that it is seldom,
perhaps never, that there is any
wholly guilty or wholly innocent
party to a divorce action. The
trial court was aware, of course,
that when people are well adjusted
and happy in marriage, one of them
does not just out of a clear blue
sky fall in love with someone
else; and that when this occurs it
is usually an indication that the
marriage has disintegrated from
other causes.
594 P.2d at 872 (footnote omitted).
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In the Read case, the parties had been married
for 25 years, had several family businesses, and
substantial other assets.

The trial court awarded the

defendant approximately 90% of the assets, and this
court reversed, stating that

fl

the property award in

this case is far too disparate."

594 P.2d at 872.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY
FIND THE VALUES OF THE PROPERTY AND THE
EARNING CAPABILITIES OF THE PARTIES
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure

requires that the court, in actions tried without a
jury, "shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusion of law thereon . . . . fl
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4 (1984) requires
that " [t]he court in all divorce cases shall make and
file its findings and decree upon the evidence."

The

court is required to make findings upon all material
issues.
1977).

Boyer Co. v. Lianell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah
The requirement that the trial court make

specific findings of fact is mandatory, and may not be
waived.

Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A,

611 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980).

The failure of the

trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error.

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d

1339 (Utah 1979).
13

1336,

Findings of fact in a divorce action serve two
important functions.

The first function is to enable

the reviewing court to properly exercise its
responsibilities:
Rational decision making by the trial court
requires that the court address and resolve
all pertinent subordinate and ultimate
factual issues which must be resolved on the
basis of the evidence presented and the
applicable rules of law. This process is
even more important to the proper function
of a reviewing court. Appellate courts
simply are not in a position to evaluate
and resolve conflicting oral testimony as
accurately as a trial court. The failure of
the trial court to make findings of fact is
not only reviewable, but it is also
reversible error.
Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d
392, 395 (Utah 1980);

See also Rucker v. Dalton, 598

P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979).
In light of this rule, the prejudicial nature of
the trial court's failure to make specific findings of
fact in this matter is readily apparent.

In order

to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion of this matter, it is necessary for
Mr. Peck to show that the value of the property
awarded to him was so disproportionate to the value of
that awarded to Mrs. Peck as to evidence an abuse of
discretion.

Although Mr. Peck has attempted to make

that showing in Point I of this brief, that showing is
rendered more difficult and uncertain because of the
14

widely varying opinions as to the value of the
properties.
The second purpose of specific findings of fact
in a divorce action is to provide a baseline from
which future provisions for modification of the
alimony or property distribution awards can be
made. An example of this is in Hialey v. Hialev, 675
P.2d 379 (Utah 1983).

The trial court in that case

had commented from the bench that the wife, who had
significant medical problems, could probably work and
support herself, but made no specific findings to that
effect.

The trial court made a small award of

alimony, and the wife appealed.

This court reversed

the alimony award as too low, and also stated that a
specific finding of fact as to the wife's

ability to

work and her income producing potential would be
necessary

to establish a baseline for possible future

modifications.

676 P.2d at 382 n.l.

It is very conceivable that either party to this
action may subsequently petition the trial court for
modification of the divorce

decree.

The modification

could be either as to alimony or as to the property
award.

Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980).

It is well established that on a petition for
modification the trial court must first determine
whether there has been a change of circumstances.

15

Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).

As is set

forth in Higley, supra, the trial court cannot
determine whether there has been change in
circumstances unless the initial divorce court has
made a specific finding as to the circumstances at the
time of the divorce.
In addition to the trial court's failure to
specifically find the value of the property owned by
the parties, the court failed to make any finding as
to the income producing potential of the husband.

As

in Higley, supra, the court here commented that it
appeared that the husband could probably earn money,
but failed to find how much money the husband or the
wife could earn.

The husband is therefore entitled to

have this case remanded with instructions to the trial
court to enter specific findings of fact.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's property award should be
reversed, and this case remanded with directions to
make an equal division of the marital property.

In

the alternative, the case should be remanded with
instructions that the trial court enter specific
findings of fact and

make such adjustments in the

property as are warranted in light of the specific
facts so found.

L6

DATED this $k+j^

day of December, 1984.-
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S< REX LEW^S, for:
HOWARD, L'£WIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing were mailed to the following/ postage
prepaid/ this j*(Ak

da

Y

of

December, 1984.

Mr. Like Pappas
Attorneys for Respondent
23 South Carbon Avenue
Price, UT 84501

Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff;
vs
DONALD J. PECK,
Defendant.

Civil No 14078

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and,
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel,
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis;
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully
advised in the premises now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident

of Carbon County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three
months immediately next prior to the commencement of this action.

Page Two
2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the

16th day of September, 1950 at Elko County, Nevada and have
been husband and wife since that time.
3.

That there have been five children born as the issue

of this marriage, four of whom are still living and all of whom
have attained their legal age of majority and are self-supporting.
4.

That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly

causing her great mental stress and suffering.
5.

That the parties hereto have accumulated substantial

real and personal property during this thirty-four year marriage.
That the Court is having difficulty in properly trying to
distribute those assets because they are not liquid and nearly
all of them are subject to debt that require monthly or annual
payment in substantial amounts and the evidence does not disclose
a viable source from which such payments can readily be made.
The matter is further complicated in that the Court feels that
the true value of Diana Corporation has not been fully disclosed
nor has the income been taken from that company by the Defendant.
It appears obvious that the Defendant is living off the income
from the company but the evidence is lacking as to the extent
of such draws or the availability of funds from which to order
any direct payments or alimony payments.

The only source of incoi

to the parties at the time of the divorce hearing was the
corporation which, over the years, has been the primary source
of income along with the greenhouse business that has been depleti
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to the point where more capital is going to have to be expended
to make it a profitable concern.

Taking in to consideration the

exhibits introduced at trial and the difficulties outlined herein,
the Court hereby finds that the real and personal property
accumulated by the parties is awarded as follows:
A.

To the Plaintiff:
1.

The home of the parties located at the

Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom.

Said property located in Carbon County, State of

Utah, is more particularly described as follows:
PARCEL I

Beginning 175 8 f t . West of the Southeast
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South
Range 9 East, Salt Lake Base fand Meridian
and running thence North 0°25 East 60
f e e t ; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly
400 f e e t to i n t e r s e c t i o n of the East
r i g h t of way of highway; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y
along s a i d r i g h t of way 190 f e e t to point
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29
f e e t and West 1421.87 feet of East 1/4 f
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00
West 70.71 f e e t ; thence Westf 248 f e e t , more
or l e s s ; thence North
00°34 West 45 f e e t ;
thence North 08°28 f 53" East 5.05 f e e t ;
thence East 298 f e e t , more or l e s s to point
of beginning.
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.

S&
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2.

All of the household furniture, fixtures,

appliances and like household items now located in the home of
the parties together with any bronze or antique items.
3.

The Swasey property together with all

right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Swasey

property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL II
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9
East, SLB&M; SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also,
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet
West of the Northeast Corner of Section
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence East
520 feet; thence Northeasterly along West
bank of canal to a point 570 feet East
of beginning; thence West 570 feet to
point of beginning. Also, beginning
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 1;
thence West 820 feet; thence South
500 feet; thence East 570 feet; thence
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North
80 feet to point of beginning.
Containing approximately 56.63 acres
and including all appurtenances and
improvements thereto appertaining.
4.

That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek

property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Miller

Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is
more particularly described as follows:

Page Five
PARCEL I I I
Beginning at the North 1/16 Corner of
of Section 4 and Section 3 ,
Township 15 South, Range 10 East of
SLB&M; s a i d corner being marked with
a 1/2 inch pipe in the ground; thence
North 0°37 f 30" West 50 f e e t to the
point
of beginning; thence South 89°28 f 35fn
West 639.42 f e e t ; thence North 0°45
West
12 34.82 f e e t ; thence North
89 0 41'54" East 642.13 f e e t along t h e
North l i n e of t h e Section t o t h e NE
corner of Section 4; thence South
0°37'30 ff West 1232.32 f e e t along t h e
East l i n e of Section 4 t o t h e point of
beginning.
Containing approximately 17 acres and
i n c l u d i n g a l l improvements and appurtenances
thereto appertaining.
5.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the greenhouse

business t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d a c c e s s o r i e s
i n c l u d i n g t h e 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump t r u c k .
6.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac

automobile provided t h a t she assumes t h e o u t s t a n d i n g
indebtedness thereon and holds t h e Defendant harmless therefrom.
B.

To t h e Defendant:
1.

All of t h e r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in t h a t

Corporation known as Diana, Inc. subject to a l l indebtednesses
owed on any of t h e equipment or owed by t h e company i t s e l f
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f
harmless.
2.

The 1979 GMC v e h i c l e subject to any

o u t s t a n d i n g indebtedness thereon provided t h a t he holds t h e
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom.

©>

Page Six
3.

All of t h e personal items of p r o p e r t y

in Defendants possession.
C.

The family annuity insurance p o l i c y through

T r a v e l e r s Insurance s h a l l remain in e f f e c t in i t s c u r r e n t
s t a t e and each of t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l remain t h e b e n e f i c i a r y
of t h e o t h e r .
6.

Since the corporation i s t h e only source of immediate

income and have, based upon i t s p r i o r business record, the
p o t e n t i a l of future income, t h e Court orders t h a t the
Defendant pay the P l a i n t i f f as and for alimony, t h e cash
sum of $10,000.00, payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year
with t h e f i r s t payment due on o r before December 31, 1984 and
l i k e payments due on or before December 31 of each and every
year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l s a i d cash sum has been paid in f u l l .
This amount w i l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e
greenhouse business so t h a t she can be s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g .
7.

The Court orders t h a t each of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o pay

t h e i r own costs and a t t o r n e y s f e e s .
8.

The Court p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d a temporary order r e q u i r i n g

the Defendant to pay t o t h e P l a i n t i f f t h e sum of $1,500.00 per
month as temporary alimony during t h e pendency of t h i s a c t i o n .
The Defendant made a Motion to vacate s a i d order on the grounds
t h a t he did not have income in which t o pay t h a t amount.
The Defendant did not p e r s o n a l l y appear, but appeared through
Counsel at t h e time the Court heard the o r i g i n a l Order To Show
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Cause and the Court denied the Motion to vacate the temporary
order but does alter its order to make it effective for
the period of one month covering the period from the date of the
Order To Show Cause on March 19, 1984, to the trial date
on April 19, 1984.

The Decree shall provide that Defendant

shall pay the temporary alimony sum of $1,500.00 due under
the temporary order to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days
from the date of this Decree.
9.

On the grounds that the parties have been separated

for in excess of six months, the Court finds cause to waive
the three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow
the Decree of Divorce issued in this case to become absolute
and final upon its entry by the Clerk of the Court in
the Registry of Actions.
10.

That the Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of

her Complaint by adequate evidence.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact
now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce

from the Defendant.
2.

That the property and debts accumulated by the parties

during this marriage are awarded pursuant

to paragraph five and

subdivisions thereof of the Findings of Fact.
3.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

the case sum of $10,000.00 for and as alimony, payable at the
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rate of $2,000.00 per year with the first payment due on or
before December 31, 1984 and like payments due on or before
December 31 of each and every year thereafter until said cash
sum has been paid in full.

This amount will assist the Plaintiff

in re-establishing the greenhouse business so that she can be self
supporting.
4.

That each parties is ordered to pay his or her

respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter.
5.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

the sum of $1,500.00 for and as temporary alimony due pursuant
to the Order To Show Cause and to pay same to the Plaintiff
within sixty (60) from the date of the Decree of Divorce in
this matter.
6.

For good cause shown, the Court waives the subsequent

three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow the
Decree of Divorce issued herein to become absolute and final
upon its entry by the Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions.
DATED this/iTday of June, 1984.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
S. REX LEWIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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LUKE G. PAPPAS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
23 SOUTH CARBON AVENUE
PRICE, UTAH 84501
PHONE: 801/637-0177
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,
Plaintiff;

:

DECREE OF DIVORCE

:

VS

:

DONALD J. PECK,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 14078

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and,
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel,
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis;
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully
advised in the premises and having entered the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is granted a Divorce from Defendant.

2.

That the property accumulated by the parties during

this marriage is awarded as follows:
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A.

To the Plaintiff:
1.

The home of the parties located at the

Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom.

Said property located in Carbon County, State of

Utah, is more particularly described as follows:
PARCEL I
Beginning 1758 ft. West of the Southeast
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South Range
9 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
and running thence North 0°25f East 60
feet; East 308 ft.; thence Southwesterly
400 feet to intersection of the East
right of way of highway; thence Northeasterly
along said right of way 190 feet to point
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29
feet and West 1421.87 feet to East 1/4
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00T
West 70.71 feet; thence West 248 feet, more
or less; thence North 00°34f West 45 feet;
thence North 08o28f53,f East 5.05 feet;
thence East 298 feet, more or less to point
of beginning.
Including all appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.
2.

All of the household furniture, fixtures,

appliances and like household items now located in the home of
the parties together with any bronze or antique items.

®
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3.

The Swasey property together with all

right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Swasey

property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL II
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9
East, SLB&M: SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also,
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet
West of the Northeast Corner of Section
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence 520
feet; thence Northeasterly along west
bank of canal to a point 570 feet Eafet of
point of beginning; thence West 570 feet to
point of beginning. Also, beginning
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 1;
thence West 820 feet; thence South
500 feet; thence East 570 feet feet; thence
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North
80 feet to point of beginning.
Containing approximately 56.63 acres and
including all appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.
4.

That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek

property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Miller

Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL III
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e North!/16 Corner of
S e c t i o n 4 and S e c t i o n 3 ,
Township 15 South, Range 10 E a s t of
SLB&M; s a i d c o r n e r b e i n g marked w i t h
a 1/2 i n c h p i p e in t h e ground; t h e n c e
North 0 ° 3 7 f 3 0 " West 50 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t
of b e g i n n i n g ; t h e n c e South 8 9 ° 2 8 f 3 5 "
West 639.42 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 0 ° 4 5 '

m
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West 1234.82
f e e t ; thence North
f
89"41 54" East 642.13 feet along t h e
North l i n e of the Section to the NE
corner of Section 4; thence South
0 o 37 t 30 f f West 1232.32 feet along t h e
East l i n e of Section 4 t o t h e point of
beginning.
Containing approximately 17 acres and
i n c l u d i n g a l l improvements and appurtenances
t h e r e t o a p p e r t a i n i n g , subject to reservations and
rights-of- way of Record.
5.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the greenhouse

b u s i n e s s t o g e t h e r with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d a c c e s s o r i e s
i n c l u d i n g t h e 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump truck.
6.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac

automobile provided t h a t she assume the o u t s t a n d i n g
indebtedness thereon and holds t h e Defendant harmless
B.

therefrom.

To t h e Defendant:
1.

All of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in t h a t

Corporation known as Diana, I n c . subject to a l l

indebtednesses

owed on any of the equipment or owed by t h e company i t s e l f
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f
harmless.
2.

That 1979 GMC v e h i c l e subject to any

o u t s t a n d i n g indebtedness thereon provided t h a t he holds the
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom.
3.

All of the personal items of property in

Defendants p o s s e s s i o n .
3.

That the Defendant i s ordered to pay t o the P l a i n t i f f

the sum of $10,000.00 as a lump sum cash alimony payment,
payable a t the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year with t h e f i r s t
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p yment due on or before December 31, 1984 and like payments
due on or before December 31 of each and every year thereafter
until said cash sum has been paid in full.

This amount will

assist the Plaintiff in re-establishing the greenhouse business
so that she can be self-supporting.
4.

Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or his

respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter,
5.

That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

the sum of $1,500.00 pursuant to the temporary alimony order
and to pay said amount to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days
from the date hereof.
6.

For good cause shown, the Court waives the three

month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow this Decree
of Divorce to become absolute and final upon entry by the
Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions.
7.

The family annuity insurance policy through

Travelers Insurance shall remain in effect in its current
state and each of the parties shall remain the beneficiary
of the other.
DATED this ^ $ d a y of June, 19 84.
COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
S. REX LEWIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

®
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce to S. Rex Lewis, of HOWARD, LEWIS,
& PETERSEN, Attorneys for Defendant, 120 East 300 North
Street, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603 this ^ d a y of June,

1984
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